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Abstract
We explore the idea that conversational
episodes not only ground facts, but also
establish practices (know how). We apply
this idea to the well-studied phenomenon
of lexical entrainment. We provide a for-
mal model of situations giving rise to lexi-
cal entrainment, and use it to make precise
implications of extant attempts to explain
this phenomenon (the lexical pact model,
and the interactive alignment model) and
to make precise where our attempt differs:
it is an automatic and non-strategic, but
goal-driven account, which has a place for
partner-specificity and group forming. We
define a learning mechanism for practices,
and test it in simulation. We close with
a discussion of further implications of the
model and possible extensions.
1 Introduction
Agnes and Bert are playing a game. Agnes is de-
scribing a figure printed on a card to Bert, and Bert
is trying to find a copy of the card among several
similar cards. They do this for a while, and begin
to establish names for the figures, which they stick
to during the course of the game.
This of course is the well-known reference
game first described by (Krauss and Weinheimer,
1964), and made famous by (Clark and Wilkes-
Gibbs, 1986; Brennan and Clark, 1996). The lat-
ter analyse this phenomenon as one of negotiating
and forming a pact, where this metaphor is jus-
tified by observing that this ‘pact’ has parties for
which it holds (in our example, Agnes and Bert,
but not Agnes and Claire, who wasn’t party to the
conversation), and that a party that assumes she
has such a pact reacts to it being ‘broken’ by their
partner (Metzing and Brennan, 2003).
A well-known alternative proposal, that of Pick-
ering and Garrod (2004), would assume that
Agnes and Bert become, in some real sense, more
like each other while playing the game: the rep-
resentations that represent world and language to
them become more alike. Unlike in Clark et al.’s
proposal, the assumption here is that this is an
automatic process that doesn’t require reasoning
about the partner.
In this paper, we explore an idea that to some
extent is a synthesis of elements of both these pro-
posals, namely the idea that rounds in the refer-
ence game, and more generally, all kinds of inter-
actional episodes, establish practices (a notion we
take from anthropology, e.g. (Ortner, 1984; Bour-
dieu, 1990)), a form of know-how; they, automat-
ically and unreflectedly, establish a way of doing
something with someone, i.e., a way that is spe-
cific to a (type of) partner. We make precise what
this can mean for the reference game, and specu-
late more generally on how this can complement
models of interaction.
2 Lexical Entrainment in the Card
Matching Game
By lexical entrainment (a term coined by (Gar-
rod and Anderson, 1987)) we mean here the phe-
nomenon that pairs of interlocutors tend to settle
over the course of a conversation on a single de-
scription for a given object for which several de-
scriptions would possible (understandable, allow-
able by the language). This seems to be a very sta-
ble phenomenon, observed in symmetric conver-
sations between players (e.g., (Krauss and Wein-
heimer, 1964; Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986;
Garrod and Anderson, 1987; Brennan and Clark,
1996)), in conversations between novices and ex-
perts (where the experts’ terms come to dominate;
(Isaacs and Clark, 1987)), in “conversations” be-
tween humans and computers (where the strength
of the effect depends on the human’s beliefs about
the capabilities of the computer; (Branigan et al.,
forthcoming)), and in conversations between ‘nor-
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Figure 1: The game in extensive form
mal’ dialogue participants and participants suffer-
ing from severe amnesia (Duff et al., 2006).
In this section, we provide a formal model of a
situation in which the phenomenon has often been
studied, and note some characteristics of extant ex-
planation attempts.
2.1 The Game
Nature picks one card from setO. Player A, in role
IG (instruction giver), observes this, but player B,
in role IF (instruction follower), does not. IG plays
from set VA, her vocabulary. (Note that this set is
indexed by player, not role.) IF observes this, and
as reaction picks one card out of set O as well.
If IF’s pick is equal to nature’s pick, both play-
ers win. Otherwise, both lose. Players are told
whether they have won or lost, and the game is
repeated.
The similarity in the formulation above to sig-
nalling games (sequential games of incomplete in-
formation) studied in game theory (e.g., (Shoham
and Leyton-Brown, 2009)), is of course not acci-
dental. Figure 1 shows the game in extensive form,
for O = {a, b}, and VA = {1, 2, . . .} (it doesn’t
matter here what exactly is in this set). The set-
ting is slightly different, though, and we are in-
terested in slightly different questions. First, un-
like in signalling games, where the question is how
stable signalling systems evolve, we assume here
that there are already conventions between A and
B in place. Specifically, we assume that A and B,
by virtue of belonging to the same language com-
munity (which they know they do), mutually be-
lieve that 1 and 2 are good labels for a, and not so
good labels for b (and so on, for other combina-
tions of pairs of labels and entities). Second, the
question that we are interested in is why it is, if
they play this game repeatedly, possibly switching
roles between episodes, that when nature picks an
element of O they’ve encountered before, IG be-
comes more likely to chose that element from her
vocabulary that has been chosen in previous suc-
cessful episodes—and not any other one which she
has reason to believe could be successful as well.
(Remember that they assume all normal language
conventions hold.)
2.2 Lexical Pacts
The model of Brennan and Clark (1996) is charac-
terised mostly by a list of features: it is historical,
meaning that previous choices influence the cur-
rent choice, mediated by recency and frequency of
use, and also influenced by provisionality, that is
the requirement of lexical choices to be sanctioned
by the other party. An aspect that the authors stress
is that the model also assumes partner specificity:
speakers choose their wording “for the specific ad-
dressees they are now talking to” (Brennan and
Clark, 1996, p.1484).
The authors do not say much about how ex-
actly a model with these characteristics might
be realised, apart from “[the results imply that]
long-term memory representations are involved”
(p.1486), and, from a follow-up paper: “entrain-
ment is supported by an underlying episodic rep-
resentation that associates a referent, a referring
expression (and the perspective it encodes), and
other relevant information about the context of use
(such as who a partner is)” (Metzing and Brennan,
2003, p.203).
The following is our attempt at providing a for-
malisation of a model that at least is compatible
with the general tone of the description in the pa-
pers cited above. It assumes that the episodic rep-
resentations are explicitly encoded, perhaps along
the lines of the reference diaries from (Clark and
Marshall, 1978), and that the rule “reuse of labels
maximises success” is explicitly represented and
used in making the decision. (That explicit infer-
ence is involved in the model at least is a charge
that opponents seem to make often, e.g. “on their
account, alignment is therefore the result of a pro-
cess of negotiation that is specialized to dialogue
and involves inference.” (Garrod and Pickering,
2007, p.2).)
If there is reasoning involved, it must be a form
of practical reasoning, as the outcome is a way
to act. The following formulates a schema in the
form of an Aristotelic practical syllogism which
could be assumed to underlie that reasoning.
a. I want to refer to object x for you
b. I believe that honouring our pact regarding the
use of α as a label for x is the best way to do (a).
or
I believe that our last successful reference to xwas
with label α, and that re-using the last most recent
successful label is the best way to do a reference.
c. Therefore, I honour our pact, and use α.
This, then, is in this (interpretation of the)
model the type of reasoning that IG must perform
when it comes to choosing an action, and IF must
follow the corresponding version of this scheme
governing interpretation. In the course of play-
ing several episodes of the game, the set of beliefs
of the partners changes, to include beliefs about
which terms were used successfully when.
2.3 Interactive Alignment
The interactive alignment model of Pickering and
Garrod (2004), which is positioned as a counter-
proposal to the one discussed above, is similarly
only characterised indirectly and not provided
with a formalisation. Its main features are nicely
summarised in (Garrod and Pickering, 2007, p.2):
“Our claim is that a major reason for this align-
ment is that the comprehension of chef (or alterna-
tively cook) activates representations correspond-
ing to this stimulus in B’s mind (roughly corre-
sponding to a lexical entry). These representations
remain active, so that when B comes to speak, it
is more likely that he will utter chef (or cook).
[...] We assume that this tendency to align is auto-
matic.”
Applied to our formalisation of the game, it
seems that this model assumes that IG bases her
choice on whatever is most strongly activated in
her mind, and, if understood at all, this represen-
tation will increase in activation in IF, making him
more likely to use the label as well at the next
opportunity. Hence, what changes here over the
course of playing the game are the vocabularies
of the players (or rather, the way they are repre-
sented in the minds of the players); beliefs with
propositional content and reasoning do not enter
in the description of the phenomenon. There does
not seem to be room for partner-specificity in this
model.
We now turn to our model, which, as we’ve
mentioned, combines elements of both of these ap-
proaches.
3 A Learning Mechanism for Practices,
Applied to the Card Matching Game
3.1 Modelling the Players
We assume that there is an additional structure
that explicitly represents an agent’s associations
between objects and labels. Formally, for each
player there is a mapM, which is a matrix where
the rows represent the objects from O and the
columns represent the labels from V . Each cell
Mo,v encodes the strength of association between
object o and label v. Together with a strategy
for using such associations, the maps determine
the interpretation of an observed label (looking at
the respective column), or the label to chose when
wanting to refer to an object (looking at the row).
Later, we will make the maps relative to partner
and situation types, e.g.ME .
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Figure 2: Two Maps (rows are objects, columns
are labels, numbers and colours represent associa-
tion strength)
Figure 2 shows two mapsMA andMB (values
are shown as number and are also coded in colour).
It is read as follows: for object a (first row), both
players rate label 1 (first column) highly; A prefers
it, while B thinks label 5 is just as appropriate. All
labels are somewhat acceptable to refer to a (and
in fact, all labels are acceptable for any object).
For objects c, d, e (rows 3 to 5), A and B have dif-
ferent preferred labels, and if their partner picks
their preferred label to refer to any of these objects,
they would not pick out the same object, if they go
for their strongest interpretation preference. E.g.,
if A says 3 with the intention to refer to object c,
B will understand d, if both go for their strongest
preference. (This is a fairly extreme example, with
lots of ambiguity, and differences in preferences;
we will use this below to show that our learning
method can still lead to agreement even in such a
situation.)
3.2 Amended Rules of the Game, and
Learning
We define two versions of the game. In the sim-
ple version, the game is exactly as stated above in
Section 2.1. At each decision point in an episode,
the players choose greedily, that is, they go for the
appropriate cell with the highest value. E.g., if IG
observes nature picking object a, she checks what
the highest value is in the corresponding row, and
in this way finds the label she wants to use (as the
one corresponding to the column of the highest
value). IF now, on observing IG using the label,
checks in the column corresponding to the label
which row has the highest value, and takes the ob-
ject corresponding to this row as his interpretation,
which in this version of the game means that he
solves and picks this object.
The episode then closes with rewards being dis-
tributed to the players, as follows. The choice
made by IG is always reinforced (the weight of
the cell used in deciding which label to use is
increased by some factor), even if IF made the
wrong choice, and for both players. The idea here
is that the mapping IG has used is, once the game
has been revealed, mutual knowledge, and so IG
should be motivated to use it again, as should
IF. Additionally, if IF made a wrong choice, this
wrong choice is punished (the weight of the cell
used in deciding which label to use is decreased
by some factor).1
There is an interesting aspect of the game that
we have left implicit so far: when players switch
roles, they will use the map which in the previous
episode they used for generation (finding a label,
1This game is very similar to the one analysed by
(Argiento et al., 2009), who present a similar urn-based (i.e.,
numerical weight-based) learning scheme; our game, how-
ever, diverges in two important aspects: we assume that
players start with non-uniform distributions (they already
have preferences for labels/object combinations), and unlike
(Argiento et al., 2009) we do not reward or punish both
players equally. These authors are concerned with analysing
whether a signal system can be learned this way, we are con-
cerned with whether an existing signal system can be adapted.
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Figure 3: Extended action space for variant of
game with Clarification Requests
given an object) or interpretation (finding an ob-
ject, given a label) for interpretation or generation,
respectively. This ensures, without further stipu-
lations, that there is symmetry between interpreta-
tion and production: when they have used a label
successfully with a certain interpretation, they will
become more likely to use this interpretation when
they hear this label.
The second version of the game is somewhat
more complicated, as it gives the players more op-
tions for acting. (The extended action space is
shown graphically in Figure 3, for one branch af-
ter IG’s first action.) After IG has played (has pro-
vided a label α for object o chosen by Nature),
IF can decide whether to solve (pick an object),
or make a clarification request (CR). It uses the
following rules to decide what to do: if there are
“distractor objects” for the label IG used, that is,
if the highest weight in the appropriate column is
not sufficiently far away from other weights in the
column, then IF rejects, and ask a CR that could be
paraphrased as “huh?”. If this is not the case, but
there is another label that IF deems more appro-
priate for the object that is the best interpretation
given this label (in the row in which the highest
weight of the column corresponding to IF’s label is
found, there is another cell with a higher weight),
then IF asks a reformulation CR, proposing this
other label.
IG now reacts as follows to clarification ques-
tions: In reply to a reject-CR (“huh?”), IG will use
the second best label for the object that is to be
named, if there is one; otherwise, it will just repeat
the previous label. In reply to a reformulation-CR,
it will say “yes” if the proposed alternative label
is within a certain range of the original label (for
object o), “no” otherwise. Back to IF: on hear-
ing “yes”, IF will solve with the mapping it used
for the reformulation. If IG said “no”, IF picks
the best interpretation for the original label (even
though for that object IF thinks there is a better
name). If IG offers a reformulation, IF tries to find
the object that is best for both labels, but if there is
none, he picks the first one.
Rewarding the players after an episode is some-
what more involved in this variant of the game.
We now potentially have several different cells in-
volved in one episode (for making the initial pro-
posal, for formulating a CR, for answering it). Re-
wards are now computed according to formula (1),
where cn denotes the cell used at step n, counting
backwards and starting with 0, so step 0 is the last
utterance of the player being rewarded. We use
hyperbolic discounting on the reward, with some
discount factor δ; the rationale here is that the ex-
change towards the end of the episode is more im-
portant and impresses itself more on the players.
(1) cn ← cn + 1(1+δ∗n)
We again follow the principle that IG is always re-
warded, and IG’s choices—they are now transpar-
ent for IF, since IF knows what IG’s goal was—
are also reinforced for IF. IF’s own choices are re-
warded or punished depending on the success of
the episode.
Before we turn to the experiments we per-
formed with simulations of these games, two more
remarks on the second variant of the game. First,
what is the idea behind these rules (which seem
positively baroque compared to the austere rules
of Game Theory games)? They are meant to be
a relatively plausible model of how clarification
actually works (Purver et al., 2001; Purver, 2004;
Schlangen, 2004).2 They have the effect of letting
the participants more quickly explore their seman-
tic maps, as we will see below. (This perhaps inci-
dentally offers corroborating evidence for the the-
sis that clarification behaviour supports language
construction (Ginzburg and Macura, 2006).)
2Of course, ideally, these rules would be learned as well;
though not in the same game. We are assuming adult-level
language competence here. Learning clarification strategies,
perhaps modelling (Matthews et al., 2007), is an orthogonal
problem.
As a second remark, the reader is advised to
note that the players at no point keep a model of
their partner. They always only keep their own
map; a feature of this model that brings it closer
to the interactive alignment model than to the lex-
ical pacts model.
We now turn to simulation experiments with
this game and their results.3
3.3 Experiments, and Results
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Figure 4: Two maps with less ambiguity. Three
objects, five labels.
We implemented the variants of the game in a
computer program and ran experiments with two
different map sets, the one from Figure 2, and a
smaller map set with less ambiguity (Figure 4).
As evaluation measures we use task success, and
average map distance, which we define as the
mean root squared distance between cell values:
ad(Mα,Mβ) =∑i∑k√(Mαi,k −Mβi,k)2 ∗ 1i∗k
Figure 5 shows a plot of the average map dis-
tance in Experiment 1 (with the maps from Fig-
ure 2), for the variant with clarification requests
(solid lines) and that without (dashed lines). Su-
perimposed are the successful episodes (green cir-
cles) and the unsuccessful ones (blue boxes). We
see that in both variants the distance between maps
decreases steadily (faster for the variant without
CRs), and after some episodes, successes become
much more likely than failures (much later for the
variant without CRs). What may the reason be for
the differences? In the variant with CRs it takes
the players longer to align their maps, because
there is more room for misunderstanding, as there
is more exploration. The flipside of this is that they
are faster to explore the whole map, and so have
heard all relevant labels used earlier. In the vari-
ant without CRs, each episode only teaches them
3We would like to, but cannot at the moment offer a for-
mal analysis of properties of this learning method, and so can
only look at how it fares on the task.
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Figure 5: Results of Experiment 1
about one mapping, and so it can happen even af-
ter many episodes that they hit a pairing that they
haven’t sufficiently learned.
64 10 5 5 15
19 43 19 9 9
7 13 60 13 7
6 6 11 66 11
18 9 9 18 46
54 3 7 10 26
21 37 10 10 21
15 23 46 8 8
7 14 14 59 7
8 8 16 24 45
Figure 6: The maps after 20 episodes
Figure 6 shows the twomaps from Figure 2 after
20 episodes. The figure shows nicely how similar
the maps have become. Note that the players have
aligned on player A’s map; this seems to be due
simply to the fact that A was IG first, and so had
a slight, but decisive, advantage in spreading her
preferences.
Figure 7 shows the results for Experiment 2
with the simpler maps. We see the same tendency
for the variant with CR to decrease less quickly;
as the maps are so simple (but arguably much
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Figure 7: Results of Experiment 2
more representative of normal Matching Game
settings), the partners very quickly stop making
any mistakes.
We take these results as evidence that the learn-
ing mechanism does indeed lead to “lexical en-
trainment” between the partners: they come to be
much more likely to re-use successful labels, and
this indeed increases their success. So, from the
looks of it they do indeed form “conceptual pacts”,
but without any model of their partner, just by ac-
cidentally becoming more like each other.
“Is this not just priming, then?”, one may be
tempted to ask. If we understand the idea behind
priming correctly, then that is a mechanism driven
by occurrence, not by success. In our model, re-
ward is given (to IF) only when success is reached.
In that sense, our model is goal-driven, whereas
priming is not. Alternatively, our model may be
seen as a way to spell out what priming is meant to
achieve—we are not aware of much work on com-
putational models of priming with respect to this
phenomenon. (There is work by Reitter (2008),
but that is modelling corpora and not providing
simulations. More closely related is (Buschmeier
et al., 2009), where alignment and priming is mod-
elled by activation functions. However, these do
not take into account the role of clarification re-
quests and of success in reaching a communicative
goal.)
In any case, however, what we have done so far
only provides half of the story. What will hap-
pen when a player encounter a new, naive agent,
or when a previous partner starts to ‘misbehave’?
This part we have not explored with experiments
yet. As the setup is at the moment, players will re-
act in the same way to a new partner using differ-
ent terms and to their old partner suddenly using
different terms. This contradicts the findings of
Metzing and Brennan (2003) discussed above. We
discuss in the next section how the model could be
made to account for this phenomenon as well.
4 Necessary Extensions
We list in this section extensions to the model that
are necessary to bring it towards more fully cap-
turing the phenomenon (and, more ambitiously, to
making sense of the label practice).
The first of those extensions will need to cap-
ture the partner-specificity observed by Metzing
and Brennan (2003) (reactions to previous partner
switching terms) and Branigan et al. (forthcoming)
(different strength of alignment depending on be-
liefs about capabilities of (artificial) partner). At
the moment, we can only outline the likely shape
of this part of the model, and mention some re-
quirements that we would like to see met.
First, we widen the scope of the discussion. A
different view of the maps from the previous sec-
tion: We have introduced them as linking objects
and labels, but, viewed in a more general way,
what they link is a way of performing an act of
referring (or an act of understanding) to the goal
of making the partner pick out an object (or the
goal of picking out the object the partner wants
me to pick out). The maps were a special case of
what more generally we will call a policy, which
is, then, a structure that links goals and actions.
The idea now is that what is being modified dur-
ing the course of an activity is a “local” policy,
particularised to the current situation. The policy
from which one started remains stable, and a new
copy is branched off for the current conversation.
Some process of abstraction over situations then
needs to categorise and generalise: will the local
policy be of use again, do the changes need to
merged with the starting policy? In such inconse-
quential situations as the matching game, the pol-
icy (the map) might be associated in memory with
a particular speaker, and then slowly be forgotten
(or rather, regress to the base line map). But in
more weighty situations, a policy will become as-
sociated with a group of partners, or a type of sit-
uation; and conversely, a group is formed through
the association with a policy. Membership in the
group (being in a situation / doing a certain activ-
ity) then entails following this policy, this practice;
and deviating from the practice rules out member-
ship, or leads to irritation when done by a member
of the group. (I.e., practices are a form of situ-
ated normativity, (Rietveld, 2008).) This is what
a practice is, then: a policy that holds in certain
situations, for certain groups of agents.
Returning to the more concrete subject matter
of this paper: how does this account for the phe-
nomenon of partner-specificity of lexical entrain-
ment? It can explain the effect that “breaking the
pact” has, the irritation that the partner exhibits at
this, if we assume that breaking the pact simply
is not behaving in the way that the chosen policy
for this situation (which includes this partner) pre-
dicts. If we assume as a further element that the
mechanism for copying and adapting maps is sen-
sitive to aspects of the situation, then we might
have a handle on the fact that beliefs about the
partner can influence alignment with it. The re-
sults of (Branigan et al., forthcoming) might then
be explained by differences in the assumptions of
group membership: the computer believed to be
more advanced is assumed to conform stronger to
normal practices, whereas the simpler one does
not trigger strong presuppositions. Working out
these rather general ideas will have to remain for
future work, however.
We close this section by noting that the gen-
eral ideas sketched here are far from being new.
The godfather of this line of thinking of course is
Wittgenstein (1953) with the notion of language
game. The way we have restricted policies to sit-
uation types (or rather, have stipulated that this
should be done) could be seen as one way of
spelling out this notion. The particular line on
Wittgensteinian thought I’m following here is fur-
ther represented by (Levinson, 1992) and (Bour-
dieu, 1990) (from whom the label practice is
taken). More recently, the idea of conversations
establishing micro-languages explored by Larsson
(2008) is very closely related; our understanding
is that the ideas sketched here should be comple-
mentary to this approach. The precise connections
to this and other related work, however, need to be
worked out more clearly in future work.
5 Conclusions
We have provided a formal model of a game which
has often been used to study the phenomenon of
lexical entrainment (Garrod and Anderson, 1987).
We have used this model to make precise some
implications of the lexical pact model (Brennan
and Clark, 1996), and the interactive alignment
model (Pickering and Garrod, 2004), and our
own practice-based proposal, which we have also
tested in simulation, showing that it can model the
process of aligning on language use in this very
simple game.
What we have provided here is quite clearly
only a first sketch of such a practice-based account
of lexical entrainment (and, much more so, a first
sketch of a more general theory of the role of prac-
tices in conversation). It is our hope, however,
that our formalisation of the problem as outcome
of a kind of a signalling game already is a useful
contribution, and helps to better understand what
the debate actually is about—and that our sketch
of a practice-based account has at least succeeded
in positioning it as an alternative that would be
promising to work out further.
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